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Chaïm Perelman’s “First Philosophies and
Regressive Philosophy”: Commentary and Translation
David A. Frank
Michelle K. Bolduc
Chaïm Perelmans 1949 article, First Philosophies and Regressive Phi-
losophy, has remained unavailable to readers unable to read French. Our
commentary and translation is intended to provide English readers access
to the context, influences, and themes that make the article an extraordi-
narily important work in the history of twentieth-century rhetoric. In this
article, Perelman offers a powerful critique of first philosophies and an-
ticipates the problems of radical postmodernity. First Philosophies re-
mains a strikingly elegant attempt to foil what Foucault (1984, 4142) has
called the Enlightenment blackmail of reason, the assumption held by
logical positivists and radical skeptics that if reason does not yield abso-
lute and eternal Enlightenment knowledge, there can be no knowledge.
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tytecas New Rhetoric project avoids
Enlightenment blackmail by charting a third way between logical positiv-
ism and radical relativism, and First Philosophies sets forth the projects
philosophical blueprint. Commencing in 1947 and culminating in 1958 with
the publication of Traité de largumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca sought, discovered, and developed a philo-
sophical system designed as a rapprochement between dialectic (reason
and logic) and rhetoric (the art of adapting arguments to audiences). Histo-
rians of rhetoric judge the work a grand revolution (Meyer 1999, 259),
believing it marks a rhetorical renaissance in Europe, and suggest nothing
like it will appear for another 100 years after its publication (Johnstone
1971). The New Rhetoric project influenced Gadamer and a host of post-
war European and American thinkers (Mootz 1998). Michael Leff calls the
1970 English translation of Traité a bombshell (1994, 510). Beyond its
historical importance, Crosswhite suggests that the New Rhetoric project
is the single most important event in contemporary rhetorical theory
(1996, 35) and First Philosophies marks Perelmans turn from logical
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positivism to rhetoric, offering prescient answers to the postWorld War II
crises of reason, and the ideas in the article provide the Traités philo-
sophical glue (see in particular the English translation, 62).
Perelman joined many post-war theorists, including Horkheimer and
Adorno (1972), in the resistance to the reign of a disembodied Enlighten-
ment rationality. However, Perelman identified what Habermas (1987, 119)
would later call the performative contradiction in the conclusion that
radical skepticism was the only alternative to Enlightenment rationality. In
First Philosophies, Perelman responds directly to Sartres 1943 Being
and Nothingness (198; see translation below) by exposing the failure of
radical skeptics to see that they had been held hostage by Enlightenment
blackmail in accepting the Enlightenment criterion for truth, rejecting it,
and then making skepticism an absolute. Indeed, First Philosophies navi-
gates from this performative contradiction to chart a third way between
Enlightenment rationality and radical skepticism with an approach that he
labels regressive philosophy. Regressive philosophy, Perelman argues, pro-
vides the human community with a mode of philosophical reasoning lo-
cated between the extremes of Enlightenment rationality and radical
skepticism. In this space between extremes, Perelman identifies contin-
gent truths and values dependent on a rhetorical mode of reasoning, one
making moral judgments possible.
To best understand First Philosophies, we recognize the impor-
tance of historical context in the development of social theories of knowl-
edge (see Delacampagne 1999; Kennedy 1999). The intellectual networks
in which philosophers operate also influence the development of philo-
sophical systems, as Randall Collins has aptly documented. In addition to
historical context and intellectual networks, Frederick Beiser has recently
noted: [t] he best introduction to any philosophy is the biography of the
person who created it (1999, 5). He argues that textual analysis alone can-
not illuminate the motivation or meaning of a philosophy. A sense of
Perelmans biography and the cultural influences that gave rise to First
Philosophies are necessary for a proper understanding of its themes. For
Perelman, the primary intellectual exigencies of the post-war period were
the interrelated crises of justice, philosophical reasoning, and responsibil-
ity to which First Philosophies is a response.
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The crises of justice, philosophical reasoning, and responsibility
Perelmans experience during the war brought him face to face with totali-
tarianism. He was forced by the Nazis to resign from his faculty position at
the Free University of Brussels in 1940 because he was Jewish, was ar-
rested and then released by the German police in 1942, and was in hiding
from August 1943 to the liberation of Belgium in August 1944 (Schreiber
1999). Perelman helped found the Committee for the Defense of Jews (CDJ)
in July 1942 in his home, and served as the committees co-chair.
After the war, Perelman and his wife set about the task of recon-
structing Belgian society and assisting European Jews to find their way to
Palestine/Israel. To help create the conditions for cultural rapprochement,
he celebrated the actions of the Queen and the Cardinal of Belgium, both
of whom he believed worked to save Belgian Jews (Schreiber 1999). In
fact, the post-war reconstruction of Belgium plays a clear role in Perelmans
development of a regressive philosophy. For instance, Perelmans contem-
poraries, such as André Lerminiaux and the former Prime Minister Paul
van Zeeland, view this period of reconstruction as offering an occasion for
positive re-creation.1 When the war ended, Perelman returned to his teach-
ing post in the winter of 1945. Perelman had finished De la justice (1945a)
while in hiding from the Nazis. He later noted that this study was finished
in August 1944, having been written during the worst excesses of National
Socialism. It was nevertheless published with its reluctant conclusion, and
in conformity with the rigorous methodology of logical positivism (1980).
That reluctant conclusion, one that he worked through and beyond between
1944 and 1948, was that justice had no basis in reason. At this point,
Perelman concluded in favor of logical positivism, holding that scientific
knowledge is the only kind of factual knowledge and that other doctrines
are to be rejected as meaningless.
Two other conclusions attended his commitment to logical positiv-
ism in the immediate aftermath of the war. First, he made a clear distinc-
tion between the vita activa and vita contemplativa, agreeing with the
Enlightenment philosophers that the domain of philosophy was the latter.
Perelman taught a course on logic during the first semester of his return to
the Free University. A notebook in the Free University archives, labeled
1944-1945, contains a narrative outline of his view of logic. In the first
paragraph of the notebook, he wrote, philosophy deals with matters of
contemplation, not action.
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A second conclusion followed: because philosophy and reason were
limited to matters of contemplation, there could be no reasonable or ra-
tional bases for action. Yet, this conclusion was troubling for Perelman. In
a Convocation speech delivered to his students on October 8, 1949, Perelman
ruminated on the consequences of this limitation: the theoretical crisis
that tormented your elders during the period between the wars . . . resulted
from the limitations of the scientific method to scientific problems, leav-
ing us without rules of action, without conviction that one could honestly
accept outside of science itself ( 1949a, 49). Because there were no rules
of action, Perelman suggested, there was no positive doctrine developed to
oppose fascism, allowing many to degenerate into cynicism and indif-
ference, marking a significant failure of responsibility and conscience dur-
ing the war.
Perelman struggled with his conclusion that justice and value judg-
ments were arbitrary, the limitation of philosophical reason to contempla-
tion, and with the failure of many to act responsibly before and during
World War II. His trajectory from logical positivism to rhetoric is a result
of his evolving view that many philosophers held a severely limited and
truncated vision of reason. This struggle is apparent in the conference pro-
ceedings (1947 and 1949) and articles that constitute the prelude to the
New Rhetoric: The Jewish Problem [La question juive] (1945b); Free
Inquiry and democracy [Libre examen et démocratie] (1946); Selections
of the Theory of Knowledge of M. E. Dupréel [Fragments pour la théorie
de la connaissance de M. E. Dupréel] (1947b, 1948a); Ethics and Free
Choice [Morale et libre examen] (1947c); The Analytical Method in Phi-
losophy [De la méthode analytique en philosophie] (1947a); Logic and
Dialectic [Logique et dialectique] (1948d); The Problems of the Moral
Philosophy [Problemen uit de Moraalphilosophie] (1948f); The Two Prob-
lems of Human Liberty [Les deux problèmes de la liberté humaine]
(1948c); The Problem of Making Good Choices [Le problème du bon
choix ] (1948b); Truth Versus Democracy [Vérité contre démocratie]
(1948g); Freedom and Reasoning [Liberté et raisonnement] (1949b);
Free Inquiry, Yesterday and Today [Le libre examen, hier et aujourdhui]
(1949a); First Philosophies and Regressive Philosophy [Philosophies
premières et philosophie régressive] (1949e) and his first publication with
Olbrechts-Tyteca, Logic and Rhetoric [Logique et rhétorique] (1950).
These publications chart his search for a method of securing justice
and making value judgments, a philosophy of action, and a project that
could extend reason into matters of responsibility. Perelman first mentions
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rhetoric as an answer to the crises of justice, philosophical reason, and
responsibility in First Philosophies. His turn to rhetoric was a result of
the intellectual network in which he operated as he appropriated and cri-
tiqued the ideas of several prominent thinkers of his milieu and those of
medieval and classical time periods.
Perelmans intellectual network
We capture the intellectual influences most apparent in First Philosophies
in the following diagram:
Perelman
Aristotle
Cicero
Sophists
Latini
Sartre Gonseth Paulhan
Influence 
Critique 
Heidegger
Dupreel
Bergson
Figure One: Perelmans Intellectual Network (19441949)
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In her history of the New Rhetoric project, Olbrechts-Tyteca details their
intellectual voyage from logical positivism to rhetoric. She and Perelman
identify Plato and in particular Jean Paulhan and his book Les Fleurs de
Tarbes, ou la Terreur dans les Lettres [The Flowers of Tarbes, or the Terror
in Literature], as the revelation providing them with a vision beyond
logical positivism.
It was almost by chance that our search put us in the presence of classical
rhetoric. I liked the books of Jean Paulhan, Les Fleurs de Tarbes, notably.
There are, in its appendix, some extracts from Brunetto Latini [Li livres dou
Trésor], that showed an ancient author who also wondered about problems of
argument. And if he wondered about them, it was not in a private capacity, but
because others had done it before him. It was only a single step from there to
the great classical tradition and notably to Aristotle, the Topics and the Rheto-
ric. . . . (Olbrechts-Tyteca 1963, 56)
Perelman states in the French edition of Lempire rhétorique [Realm of
Rhetoric] that they were greatly influenced by Paulhans Fleurs. There,
Perelman writes that reading Fleurs was a revelation and the appendix,
with extracts from Latinis rhetoric, led them back to the Greek and Latin
tradition of rhetoric:
The long-term research, undertaken with Mme L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, led us to
completely unexpected conclusions, which were a revelation for us; that is,
that a specific logic concerning value judgments did not exist, but that what
we were looking for had been developed in a very old discipline, at present
forgotten and disdained. This revelation was provided to us when we read the
book of Jean Paulhan, Les Fleurs de Tarbes. The author published in the ap-
pendix, extracts from the rhetoric of Brunetto Latini, Dantes teacher. From
this text, it was easy for us to go back to Aristotles rhetoric, and the entire
Greco-Latin tradition of rhetoric and topics. (1977, 9)
Fleurs is a greatly influential book, as it not only affected the thinking of
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, but Blanchot and a host of other post-war
French thinkers. Like Perelman, Jean Paulhan envisioned a transforma-
tion, even a kind of rebirth, of rhetoric. Paulhan, the secretary, director,
and later editor of the Nouvelle Revue Française, was a major figure in the
French literary world from the 1920s to the 1960s. His associations with
such writers and painters as Proust, Valéry, Gide, Bataille, Braque, and
Picasso, to name but a few, won him the reputation of the gray eminence
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of French literature. Paulhans Fleurs, which first appeared as a book in
1941, signals in his words a reinvention of rhetoric.
For Paulhan, rhetoric is less a trite study of figures of style than a
critical way of working through the ambiguities of language and literature.
In his description of terror, Paulhan revalorizes rhetoric. Terrorist litera-
ture desires to reinvest literature with authenticity by rejecting literary
commonplaces, which Paulhan terms as clichés. By unmasking the illu-
sions under which terrorists work (chiefly, the notion that language can be
transparent), however, rhetoric appears to allow writers to communally
recognize these clichés or commonplaces as commonplaces, and thereby
seems to resolve the tense problematic of authenticity within language and
literature. Paulhan writes, nous avons poussé à bout la Terreur, et découvert
la Rhétorique (159) [we have pushed terror as far as it will go, and have
discovered rhetoric].
Fleurs is also a work that firmly engages with what we now term as
postmodern concerns; there is a textual self-awareness that leads the
reader into a maze of doubled, duplicitous, utterly ambiguous and uncer-
tain meanings rather than a final, complete understanding of the text and
its significance. Paulhan ends the Fleurs (which is not the end of the book
itself) with a disavowal of all that he has written to this point: Mettons
enfin que je nai rien dit [Lets say that I said nothing] (177). This enig-
matic retraction calls the text itself into question: we are left unable to read
(or write) the clichés that are meant to free writer and reader from a per-
petual preoccupation with language; we are equally unable to understand
the Fleurs itself as a definition of literature, even if enfantine [childish]
as Paulhan claims at the beginning of the Fleurs (24). Syrotinski notes that
[t]he book is thus a performance of the very radical ambiguity that it talks
about, an ambiguity that is not simply an equivocation about what the book
is saying, but that suspends it between saying and doing, stating and per-
forming, original and commonplace (Syrotinski 1998, 90). Paulhans sus-
pension between the poles of antimonies is, for Perelman, the realm of
rhetoric: that space between opposites and extremes where reason-based
discourse can produce just claims.
Fleurs provoked Perelmans rhetorical turn because it pointed to a
tradition that could answer the crises of justice, philosophical reason, and
responsibility. From Paulhan, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca derived the
need for a reinvented or a new rhetoric, the value of clichés and
commonplaces (which in turn lead to the recovery of Aristotles epideictic),
and the two key topoi in the New Rhetoric project, the classical and ro-
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mantic. Paulhans ideas served as a point de départ for Perelman, who sub-
sequently developed and transformed them to fit his notion of a regressive
philosophy.
The appendix in Paulhans Fleurs contains a second point of depar-
ture for Perelman: extracts from book three of Latinis Trésor, undoubt-
edly one of the most influential works of the late thirteenth century. Latinis
text played a critical role in Perelmans refurbished understanding of rheto-
ric, for it pointed him back to Classical rhetoric. Brunetto Latini, a thir-
teenth-century Florentine notary and teacher, translated (albeit liberally)
much of Ciceros De Inventione, which appears for the most part in two of
his works, Rettorica (1260) and Li livres dou Trésor (c. 1260) (Kennedy
1999; Murphy 1974)). In part three of Li livres dou Trésor, within a discus-
sion of politics, Latini composes a full exposition of Ciceros rhetorical
logic.
If Paulhans rhetoric was quasi-postmodern, Latinis rehearsal of
Cicero is decidedly classical. In the wake of the conclusions reached in
Justice, Perelman must have been struck by this statement in the first para-
graph of the appendix: Cicero says that the most important science rela-
tive to governing the city is rhetoric, that is to say, the science of speaking,
for if there were not speech, there would be no city, nor would there be any
establishment of justice or of human company . . . (1993, 279). Latini
made note of the movement of human society from a state of savageness to
civilization because rhetoric allowed for the maintenance of reason and
justice. With the help of Latini, Perelman discovered an answer to the cri-
ses of reason and justice with the classical rhetorical tradition. Perelmans
rhetorical turn begins with Paulhan, continues with Latini and Cicero, and
then finds justification in Aristotle and his Rhetoric.
Perelman and the audience of the New Rhetoric shared the com-
mon culture of Classical thought, and Aristotle served as a locus because
he was considered by everyone the father of modern logic (Perelman
1979, 56). Seeking a foothold for a new and expanded sense of reason in
values and sources shared by the authors and the audience, Perelman in-
voked Aristotle as a source of authority for valorizing rhetoric. If Aristotle,
the father of apodictic logic, inflated reason to include the probable and
rhetoric, then Perelmans attempt to do the same must be justified.
However, it is misleading to call Perelman and his rhetoric Aristo-
telian or Classical. Perelman establishes an antimony of first philoso-
phies and regressive philosophy, suggesting that Aristotle adhered to
the Classical definition of truth and the use of dialectic in finding immu-
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table knowledge. Later, in an exchange with Stanley Rosen, Perelman noted
that what I call the classical tradition, starting with Plato and Aristotle,
continues with St. Augustine, St. Thomas [Aquinas], Duns Scotus,
Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza and is carried on by empiricism and logi-
cal positivism, as it is represented by early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (1959, 86). Perelman continued:
[T]he tradition I call classical assigns but little importance, as far as
achieving science and contemplation goes, either to practice or to the histori-
cal and situated aspects of knowledge. . . . This viewpoint is held in common
by Plato and Aristotle, as well as by thinkers such as Descartes. . . . The tradi-
tion I call classical includes all those who believe that by means of self-evi-
dence, intuitionseither rational or empiricalor supernatural revelation, the
human being is capable of acquiring knowledge of immutable and eternal
truths, which are the perfect and imperfectable reflexion of an objective real-
ity. . . .(86)
The classical tradition, Perelman noted, was not open to truths that were
fluid, partial, and in contradiction.
In First Philosophies, Perelman rescues rhetoric by detaching it
from Aristotles metaphysics. Perelman appropriates Aristotles rhetoric as
the expression of regressive philosophy, doing so to check the reach of
first philosophies. Perelman would eventually argue that Aristotle did not
have much regard for rhetoric, and that Aristotle saw rhetoric as a tool of
persuading ignorant audiences, unable to follow complex apodictic rea-
soning (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 5).
To develop an alternative to first philosophies, Perelman drew from
the work of Ferdinand Gonseth, and from the axiology and sociology of
his mentor, Eugène Dupréel, both of whom are cited in First Philosophies.
Perelmans rhetoric required a philosophical grounding, which was pro-
vided by the open philosophy of Gonseth. In retrospect, Paulhan, Gonseth,
and Dupréel were much more influential than Aristotle in provoking
Perelmans rhetorical turn. Perelman and Gonseth met in 1947 and remained
lifelong friends (Perelman 1979, 1012; Gonseth 1994). A Swiss professor
of mathematics, Gonseth was the editor of Dialectica, the journal that pub-
lished First Philosophies. Gonseth (1994) advanced an alternative to first
philosophy that emphasized experience in time rather than eternal knowl-
edge as central to the philosophical enterprise. Gonseth held that theory
and experience are intertwined, that reason should yield to the lessons of
experience. Experience, according to Gonseth, could only be understood
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and theorized with dialectic, which consists of four principles (wholeness,
duality, openness to revision, and responsibility), discussed in First Phi-
losophies.
Perelman equates open philosophies with regressive philosophy
and called on the writing of Eugène Dupréel to establish an epistemology
for a regressive philosophy. Dupréel, whose work Perelman summarized
in two-part articles in Dialectica (1947b, 1948a), argued that there are lim-
its to human knowledge, and that the history of abandoned knowledge claims
reveals the power of new experience to challenge received wisdom. With
Gonseth and Dupréel, Perelman established the parameters of his rhetori-
cal turn.
As one reads First Philosophies, the intellectual network in which
Perelman operated as well as his originality becomes apparent. In addi-
tion, the reader interested in the history of rhetoric as well as those seeking
insight into the problems of post-Enlightenment thought should find use in
the following themes developed in First Philosophies.
First Philosophies provides a metaphysical foundation for rheto-
ric, a grounding that is not absolute but firm enough to base contingent
truths. In so doing, it identifies and avoids the performance contradiction
that plagues post-Enlightenment thought. First Philosophies establishes
a third way between the absolutes of first philosophies and radical skepti-
cism. It does so by identifying contingent truths, those strong enough to
warrant temporally restricted knowledge, but open to further modification
and change. Knowledge need not be timeless and eternal, nor is under-
standing impossible. With regressive philosophy and rhetoric, it is pos-
sible to move beyond the demands of certainty and the pitfalls of aporia to
arrive at contingent but reasonable judgments. Once liberated from the
performance contradiction of post-Enlightenment thought, questions of
values, justice, and action could be judged in the light of a regressive phi-
losophy, one that sought progress, learned from mistakes and errors, and
improved in time.
First Philosophies deploys the idea of temporality to distinguish
first philosophies from regressive philosophy. While first philosophies fo-
cus on eternal principles, thereby marking one moment in timegenerally
from the pastas original, the source of its present-day principles, a re-
gressive philosophy does not privilege any one particular moment:
[The proponents] of regressive philosophy situate the present in a historical
becoming, of which they do not believe themselves capable of privileging
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any moment by removing it a priori from all evolution. They challenge
Aristotles principle that calls for an absolutely first term to any regressive
series (202; see translation).
First Philosophies provides a framework for a philosophical rea-
son that allows for justice and the life of action. The four principles Perelman
borrows from Gonseth and the careful juxtaposition of first and regressive
philosophies provide tentative answers to the intellectual crises Perelman
confronted in the post-war setting. Rhetoric was the answer, although rheto-
ric makes but a brief appearance in the article. To develop this answer,
Perelman establishes a metaphysical basis for dialogue and rhetoric:
Regressive philosophy does not seek utopian perfection, rather, it aspires to
problem solving through constant deliberation and human interactioncarried
out by a society of free minds interacting with each otherthat accounts for
the advantages and disadvantages of the positions human take as they deliber-
ate in the context of lived experience. (202; see translation)
And it is this step from a regressive metaphysic/philosophy to the free minds
interacting, to rhetoric, which is important in the history of rhetoric.
Perelman turned to rhetoric out of a concern for metaphysics. And it
is rhetoric that ensures for Perelman both the freedom of minds to interact
and the responsibility for judgments in the field of action. With the follow-
ing words, Perelman announces his rhetorical turn for the first time, root-
ing his view of the ancient discipline in responsibility:
Only rhetoric, and not logic, allows the understanding of putting the principle
of responsibility into play. In formal logic, a demonstration is either convinc-
ing or it is not, and the liberty of the thinker is outside of it. However, the
arguments that one employs in rhetoric influence thought, but never force his
agreement. The thinker commits himself by making a decision. His compe-
tence, sincerity, integrity, in a word, his responsibility are at stake. . . . It is
this practical aspect, this almost moral aspect of philosophical activity that
allows the rejection of a purely negative skepticism. The skeptic rejects every
absolute criterion, but believes that it is impossible for him to decide since he
lacks such a criterion, just as in first philosophies. But he forgets that in the
domain of action, not to choose is still making a choice, and that one runs
even greater risks by abstaining than by acting. . . . Dogmatism and skepti-
cism are both opposed to the principle of responsibility, because they both
search for a criterion that would make the choice necessary, and would elimi-
nate the liberty of the thinker. It is precisely the principle of responsibility
that, by affirming the personal commitment of the thinker in philosophical
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activity, constitutes the only valuable refutation of negative skepticism. (198
199; see translation)
This is a critical passage in that it juxtaposes rhetorical logic with the two
alternatives, brilliantly illustrating how formal logic and radical skepti-
cism are both victims of Enlightenment blackmail in assuming that knowl-
edge must be absolute, thereby absolving both of responsibility for their
theses. Rhetorical logic requires commitment and responsibility because it
provides the guide for human action. In this vision, rhetoric serves as the
bridge between the vita contemplativa and vita activa, thereby holding ac-
countable those who advocate values that become the touchstones for ac-
tion, affecting as well the welfare of local and universal audiences.
First Philosophies received a rejoinder, in German, from Swiss
philosopher Michel Bernays (1950), to which Perelman responded (1952).
Bernays wrote that Perelman had misinterpreted Gonseth and, foreshad-
owing complaints made by critics of the New Rhetoric project, argued that
Perelman had failed in First Philosophies to adequately account for the
real, necessary, and the absolute. Perelman, also foreshadowing his response
to the critics of the New Rhetoric, argued that regressive philosophy would
learn from the mistakes made by first philosophies, modify the rules of
knowledge based on experience, and would focus on an unforeseeable fu-
ture rather than an explained past.
We are hopeful that our translation will illuminate a pivotal moment
in the history of rhetoric and provide the reader with useful theoretical
insights. In addition, we thank the editor of Dialectica for permission to
translate Perelmans article. Noémi Perelman-Mattiss help was invaluable
as she assisted with the translation and provided us with critical insights
into the work of her father.
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